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Introduction 
At first sight, including the work of Weber in a handbook on leisure theory seems rather odd as his 
work is mainly concerned with the domains of religion and work. Unsurprisingly, the term ‘leisure’ 
is never mentioned in his 1400+ page magnus opus Economy and Society. Yet, his work in both 
domains has greatly influenced leisure studies. Below we will discuss: 1) the Protestant Ethic and 
the absence of leisure, focusing on the relationship between religion and consumption, 2) 
bureaucracy and rationalization of leisure, discussing McDonaldization and re-enchantment, and 
3) social inequality and leisure: class, status, party, discussing how status – vis-à-vis class –matters 
for lifestyle studies. Each section consists of a discussion of Weber’s theories on the topic, followed 
a description of how his ideas have affected recent leisure studies. Finally, we will provide some 
suggestions for further research in the conclusion. 
 The Protestant Ethic and the absence of leisure 
Weber’s foundations 
In his masterpiece The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism as well as in other works on 
the sociology of religion, Weber examines the “inner relationship between certain expressions of 
the old Protestant spirit and modern capitalistic culture” (Protestant Ethic, p. 11). These certain 
expressions refer to the ascetic rationalism of Calvinism, which differed from the mysticism of 
many other world religions in several ways (Turner, Beeghley, and Powers 1995, p. 205). First, 
those who accepted the Calvinist doctrine believed in predestination, i.e., that God – and God alone 
– decided who would be saved and who would be damned. As such, Calvinists were anxious to 
know whether they were among the chosen ones. Second, as they could not get any certainty about 
their fate, they inevitably felt a great inner loneliness and isolation. Third, although one could not 
influence God’s decision – his ways were considered incomprehensible and his motives 
unsearchable, people began to look for signs that they were among the elect. People wanted to be 
convinced that they deserved good fortune (Social Psychology, p. 271). Besides faith, intense 
worldly activity helped to win certainty of his state of grace and alleviate doubts (Economy and 
Society, p. 547). Fourth, all believers were considered instruments of God who were expected to 
live rational ascetic lives and master this world through work in a worldly vocation (Religious 
Rejections, p. 325). The devout should therefore not fall for irrational sensual pleasures, 
superstitions or things of the flesh. As such, “the path to salvation was turned away from a 
contemplative ‘flight from the world’ and towards an active ascetic ‘work in this world’” (Social 
Psychology, p. 290).  
 According to Weber, such worldly asceticism was one of the factors that fostered the rise 
of the spirit of capitalism (Social Psychology, p. 268). This capitalistic culture contains several key 
elements (Turner, Beeghley, and Powers 1995, p. 203). First, work is valued as an end in itself – a 
duty, instead of means to an end. “The valuation of the fulfilment of duty in worldly affairs as the 
highest form which the moral activity of the individual could assume” was unquestionably new, 
according to Weber (Protestant Ethic, p. 40). As such, considering one’s profession a ‘calling’ is 
a key characteristic of the ethic of capitalistic culture (p. 19). Second, wealth and profit are evidence 
of economic as well as personal virtue, i.e. a certification of grace. “If success supervenes upon 
such acquisitive activity, it is regarded as a manifestation of god’s blessing upon the labor of the 
pious man and of god’s pleasure with his economic pattern of life” (Economy and Society, p. 543). 
Third, everyday life should be methodically organized by reason. Calvinists took systemization of 
ethical conduct quite literally by entering or tabulating their sins, temptations, and progress in 
religious account-books (Protestant Ethic, p. 76). Fourth, future satisfaction is more important than 
immediate happiness. As such, the enjoyments of wealth is forbidden to the ascetic and profit 
should be reinvested in the honor of God. 
 When such capitalistic culture is (still) strongly coupled to Calvinism, there is hardly any 
place for leisure as every worldly activity should be performed in God’s glory.  First, if labor is a 
divine calling, and considering the short span of human life to confirm one’s election by showing 
personal virtue, “loss of time through sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is 
necessary for health, six to at most eight hours, is worthy of absolute moral condemnation 
(Protestant Ethic, p. 105). Second, enjoying non-rational activities (art and erotic life) that do not 
have a clear religious value were considered suspect, as deifications of the creaturely. As long as 
the creative artist experiences his work as resulting either from a calling, the relationship between 
art and the religious ethic remains harmonious (Religious Rejections, p. 341). However, as art aims 
to provide “salvation from the routines of everyday life”, it begins to compete with the redemptory 
function of religion and the relationship becomes more problematic, even blasphemous (p. 342). 
Third, indulging in immediate material wealth was morally abject. “The real moral objection is to 
relaxation in the security of possession, the enjoyment of wealth with the consequence of idleness 
and the temptations of the flesh, above all of distraction from the pursuit of a righteous life”. 
(Protestant Ethic, pp. 105). Thus, leisure in general was regarded a competitor to the kingdom of 
God (Social Psychology, pp. 291). 
 
Building on Weber 
Probably the most important and celebrated publication on leisure and consumption taking much 
of its inspiration from Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is Colin 
Campbell’s (1987) The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism. In this book, 
Campbell wonders how it is possible that the Puritanically inclined English middle classes shifted 
to an ethic of consumerism in the eighteenth century. Campbell (1987, p. 12) aims for an update 
and extension of Weber’s arguments: “Thus, the basis of an ethical code which served to justify 
consumption is described largely by a process of distinguishing it from that “Protestant ethic” 
described by Weber. Despite these differences, the underlying structure of the argument advanced 
mirrors that of Weber’s, stressing the central role of a cultural ‘ethic’ in enabling the introduction 
of a ‘modern’ form of economic action, demonstrating both their ‘congruence’ and their 
psychological and cultural connections”. Indeed, if we consider Weber’s thesis as “an account of 
the development of a distinctive ‘motivational complex’” (Campbell, 2006, p. 210), the parallels 
Campbell is pointing at are obvious. The middle class did not seek pleasure in material 
consumption or physical sensations, but rather in emotions to be tickled by the imagination and 
daydreaming. The novel, probably the romantic consumer good par excellence, was not loved as a 
commodity to be owned, but as an object of self-illusionary engagement, or modern autonomous 
imaginative hedonism (Campbell, 1987, p. 78). Thus, other than traditional hedonism, which seeks 
gratification in the object itself, Campbell’s modern hedonism finds pleasure in a degree of control 
over the meanings of objects. Moreover, “the modern hedonist possessed the very special power to 
conjure up stimuli in the absence of any externally generated sensations. This control is achieved 
through the power of imagination, and provides infinitely greater possibilities for the maximization 
of pleasurable experiences than was available under traditional, realistic hedonism to even the most 
powerful of potentates. This derives not merely from the fact that there are virtually no restrictions 
upon the faculty if imagination, but also from the fact that it is completely within the hedonist’s 
own control. It is this highly rationalized form of self-illusory hedonism which characterized 
modern pleasure-seeking” (ibid., p. 76). 
 But how can this modern hedonism be derived from the Protestant ethic? Campbell notes 
that the Puritans were no total strangers to the concept of pleasure. ‘Rational’ recreation was 
permitted and pleasure, including the enjoyment of sexuality, was alright as long as it was not an 
end in itself but “accompanied acts demanded by God or supported by reason” (ibid., p. 102). 
Campbell goes on to argue that Weber, trying to unravel Protestantism’s impact on economic 
production, did not pay much attention to strands of Protestant thought that were more relevant for 
understanding its relation to consumption. Thus, Calvinism was not only very rational and ascetic, 
but its teachings also had the abovementioned profound emotional effects of loneliness, self-doubt 
and fear as a result of predestination. Interestingly, as Calvinism went into decline, signs of 
godliness were increasingly sought in character traits, the experience of saving grace, and 
emotional states that had a special spiritual significance, not just in conduct or material success. 
Valuing the possession and manifestation of feelings in Calvinism, together with the attenuation of 
belief and a growing faith in the natural goodness of man, ultimately led to sentimentalism, 
allowing one to derive pleasure or bitter-sweet melancholy from religious meditations. Thus, 
Campbell (1987: 142) arrives at the notion of sensibility as an ideal of character in the eighteenth 
century that “clearly embraces a readiness to indulge emotions for the pleasures which they can 
supply”.  
Sentimentalism, stemming from Calvinism, then, is a precursor to romanticism. With its 
emphasis on creativity and personal, divine genius, this shift “resulted in two closely connected 
forms of religious faith: a pan-psychic mysticism, or pantheism, with regard to nature at large, 
combined with a purely personal drama of salvation and redemption to be acted out within the 
confines of the self”, turning romanticism into “a theory of art extrapolated into a philosophy of 
life” (p. 182). And now pleasure became not just something acceptable, but in fact something 
dignified, the “defining attribute of all life” (p. 191) demonstrating one was not too alienated from 
nature. Hence, with creativity being a central characteristic of the divine, imagination became a 
highly appreciated quality allowing one to ponder the true and perfect world and experience 
pleasure in doing so. Experiencing such pleasure came to indicate one’s search for a more perfect 
world and was therefore valued positively (unless it was pleasure derived from immediate 
sensation). As such, Campbell’s brilliant application of Weber’s work demonstrates how Weber’s 
thought is still relevant for explaining today’s insatiable consumer on his ongoing quest for pleasure 
and why some forms of pleasure seem more in line with ‘good taste’ than others. 
A limited number of studies into the relation between leisure and religion is more loosely 
based on Weber and markedly less ambitious in this respect. Katz-Gerro and Jaeger (2012) find 
that religiosity (frequency of church attendance), rather than religion per se, is positively related 
with cultural consumption. Moreover, the impact of religiosity is comparable to that of well-known 
determinants of cultural lifestyles such as education, income and age (see also Katz-Gerro, Raz & 
Yaish, 2009).  Van Eijck (2012) found less strong direct effects of religion once socioeconomic 
and demographic characteristics were controlled for. Especially social value orientations, which 
were closely related with religious identification, turned out to be relevant for explaining cultural 
preferences for classical and modern art styles. This finding aligns with DiMaggio’s (1996) study 
on museum visitors whom he found to be less often Protestants, less often believing the Bible to 
be the literal word of God and less likely to claim that religion is important for the good life than 
non-visitors. In fact, these studies confirm that effects of religion are largely mediated by the values 
and convictions that come with certain religions. For example, Van Eijck (2012) found that a 
preference for modern or abstract visual arts is negatively related with being religious as well as 
with indicators of traditionalism such as communitarianism and social disorientation. Weber 
alluded to this very animosity between art and religion, which he attributed to the rise of the 
intellectualist perspective that values aesthetic criteria over ethical ones when judging works of art: 
“The rejection of responsibility for ethical judgment and the fear of appearing bound by tradition, 
which come to the fore in intellectualist periods, shift judgments whose intention was originally 
ethical into an aesthetic key” (Economy and Society, p. 608). The findings suggest that, indeed, 
religious people find it more difficult to put their moral criteria aside and make room for the more 
playful attitude that is required for an aesthetic enjoyment of images, irrespective of their moral 
connotations. Thus, the ‘distinctive motivational complex’ offered by religion is highly relevant 
for contemporary leisure studies and, as Campbell has demonstrated, can lead us into unexpected 
directions. 
 
Bureaucracy and the rationalization of leisure 
Weber’s foundations 
In his sociology of religion, Weber contrasted capitalistic with traditionalist culture and rational 
ascetic Calvinism with mysticism. Similarly, in his work on social stratification, he distinguishes 
three ideal types of domination or authority: charismatic, traditional and rational legal (Economy 
and Society, pp. 212-301). First, charismatic authority rests “on devotion to the exceptional 
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or 
order revealed or ordained by him” (p. 215). Charismatic leadership is solely based on the belief in 
the ‘divine powers’ of an individual. While the administrative apparatus initially consists of faithful 
disciples, over a longer period of time charismatic authority faces the problem of routinization, i.e. 
receding to traditional or rational-legal authority. Second, traditional authority is based “on an 
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising 
authority under them” (p. 215). Third, legal-rational authority rests “on a belief in the legality of 
enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands” (p. 
215). Here, legitimacy is defined by having followed the ‘right’ procedure, for example through 
voting, and leadership based on position, irrespective of the charisma of the individual fulfilling 
that position. Weber labelled the administrative apparatus of the rational-legal system a 
bureaucracy. 
 A bureaucracy contains the following elements (pp. 956-959). First, employment is based 
on knowledge and experience, often formalized in qualifications. Second, its operations are 
governed by general and calculable rules in the form of written documents (laws or administrative 
regulations) applicable to all. These rules are “more or less stable, more or less exhaustive and can 
be learned” (p. 958) and are supposed to prevent arbitrariness.  Third, there is a formal hierarchy 
with a clearly established system of super- and subordination. Fourth, all bureaucrats have a fixed 
number of specialized tasks, which fulfill a functional yet impersonal function. Fifth, there is 
segregation of official activities from the sphere of the private life. According to Weber, “the fully 
developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine 
with non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed unambiguity, knowledge of the files, 
continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and material and personal 
costs” (p. 973). Yet, a process of bureaucratization has also removed the magical from many forms 
of social interaction, which Weber labelled disenchantment.  
  
Building on Weber 
Weber’s work in rationalization and bureaucratization has been used in leisure studies to study the 
leisure industries. Building on the work of Weber, George Ritzer has shown the extensiveness of 
rationalization in what he has labelled McDonaldization, i.e. “the process by which the principles 
of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as 
well as the rest of the world” (1996, p. 1). He distinguishes between five “alluring” dimensions.  
 First, the fast-food model offers efficiency, or at least an attempt to find and use the optimum 
means to a given end. In practice, this entails three things: streamlining a variety of process (e.g. 
assembly-line production of the product, drive-troughs), simplifying goods and services (e.g. 
offering limited menu options), and using the customer to perform tasks that employees used to do 
(e.g., salad bar; Ritzer, 1996, pp. 36-58). An example of the latter is how Amazon.com not only 
has the consumers do all the work in placing the order, but also serve as unpaid reviewers (Ritzer 
1999, pp. 79-80). Online consumers even ‘do the research’ for these organizations by providing 
them data.  
 Second, McDonaldization emphasized calculability of process and product, i.e. a focus on 
quantity rather than quality of products (e.g., coffee sizes at Starbucks), efforts to create the illusion 
of quantity (e.g., use of an abundance of ice in drinks) and to reduce production and service 
processes to numbers (e.g., pizza-delivery time; Ritzer, 1996, pp. 59-78). Leisure businesses often 
also operate under the moniker ‘50,000,000 Elvis Fans Can't Be Wrong’. Consider, for example, 
the importance of TV ratings and box office openings in defining a successful (good?) movie.  
 Third, predictability is achieved through a replication of settings (e.g. using the same 
interior for restaurants all over the world), the use of scripts to control what employees say (e.g., 
by welcoming customers in a standard manner), the routinization of employee behavior (e.g., by 
using training programs) and the offering of uniform products (Ritzer, 1996, pp. 79-99). This 
echoes Horkheimer and Adorno who wrote in the Dialectic of Enlightenment : “In a film, the 
outcome can invariably be predicted at the start – who will be rewarded, punished, forgotten – and 
in light music the prepared ear can always guess the continuation after the first bars of a hit song 
and is gratified when it actually occurs.” (1997, p. 98-99). In contemporary culture industries, 
predictability is as seen as a strategy to handle risk uncertainty, explaining for example the 
popularity of sequels and movies based on successful books. 
 Fourth, McDonaldization emphasizes control by replacing humans with non-human 
technology (Ritzer, 1996, pp. 101-120). One example could be the replacement of gatekeepers 
(e.g., reviewers) – those providing tips to cultural consumers on related tastes, by algorithms. 
Another is the use of devices allowing people to scan the prices of the products they buy in the 
supermarket by themselves so they will not have to wait in line at the cash register. 
 Fifth, the irrationality of rationality refers to the negative effects of rationalization, to 
rational systems as unreasonable, dehumanizing systems, and moreover a dominating systems 
(Ritzer, 1996, pp. 121-142).  
 However, as Weber noted, the price that McDonaldization pays is that of disenchantment, 
in the realms of both work and leisure. This might lead to a growing resistance to the rationalized 
business side of leisure facilities as cathedrals of consumption, critiquing its quality, absence of the 
unpredictable, and lack of autonomy (Ritzer,1999). As such, some theorists have suggested the 
possibility of re-enchantment, particularly within the postmodern tradition (Ritzer 1999, pp. 75-
77). First, the contemporary rationalized world could be seen as both enchanting as well as 
disenchanting, for example places like Las Vegas. Second, consumers are ever more demanding 
and this affects competing leisure organizations. For example, as contemporary museum visitors 
want their visit to be more of an experience, they push museums to new, more ‘enchanting’ 
presentation styles. The famous concept of the ‘experience economy’ itself (Pine and Gilmore, 
1999) is largely about re-enchantment. Third, but on a related note, postmodern theory calls for an 
abandonment of the focus on the agentic actor, and instead emphasizes the setting in which 
consumption occurs. 
 
Social inequality and leisure: class, status, party 
Weber’s foundations 
The study of social inequality owes to Weber the notion that social stratification is not merely a 
matter of class, but rather a multidimensional phenomenon. For starters, Weber refine the notion 
of class by distinguishing between three types of classes. Property classes are largely determined 
by differences in their properties and spending power, commercial classes by the marketability of 
goods and services they own or provide, and social classes are groupings within which social 
mobility is “easy and typical” (Economy and Society, pp. 302-3-5). But more importantly, Weber 
added status group and party as alternative sources of power. Parties are mostly relevant as units 
of political power, as their actions are always directed toward a set goal and they involve 
association in order to achieve political control. Our focus, as in most studies on social inequality 
in leisure and lifestyles, will be on Weber’s fruitful distinction between classes and status groups. 
This distinction is by far the most relevant for leisure studies.  
While all three types of classes can be defined in terms of their members’ position in the 
system of production based on ownership, entrepreneurial and/or other skills, or shared working 
experiences, status groups can have different origins. Status (ständige Lage) is a claim to social 
esteem in terms of positive or negative privileges founded on 1) style of life, 2) formal education, 
or 3) hereditary or occupational prestige. Status may rest on class position, but money, property or 
entrepreneurial positions will never be the sole determinants of status. Nor will the lack thereof 
foreclose status attainment. Inversely, status may influence class position but will not be identical 
to it. The status order, for Weber (p. 927), reflects “the way in which social honor is distributed in 
a community between typical groups participation in this distribution”. Honor and power are linked 
in multiple ways, but must be distinguished due to the different yet partly overlapping sources of 
power and honor. Thus, Weber explains that “other determinants of reciprocal relations” than hose 
determined by the power of property (class) are at play and that “status groups hinder the strict 
carrying through of the sheer market principle” (p. 930).  
 For Weber, status honor “normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer 
property” (p. 932). He argues that “status honor is normally expressed by the fact that above all 
else a specific style of life is expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle” (p. 932). 
This implies certain restrictions on social intercourse and the use of fashion items or other consumer 
goods which might be considered as a claim to qualify as a member of a certain status group. Status 
groups can be quite inaccessible for non-members. Especially when membership is limited to 
people with a specific ethnicity, they can become closed castes. Such a process turns what might 
initially be mere diversity into a vertical social system of super- and subordination. However, each 
status group believes in their own specific honor and a dignity which, depending on their relative 
position, lies either in this world or, for the less fortunate, in “a future lying beyond the present, 
whether it is of this life or on another” (p. 934). 
 According to Weber, “classes are stratified according to their relations to the production 
and acquisition of goods; whereas status groups are stratified according to the principles of their 
consumption of goods as represented by special styles of life” (p. 937). This makes their relation 
inevitable as “the possibility of a style of life expected for members of a status group is usually 
conditioned economically” (p. 935). In addition, “material monopolies provide the most effective 
motives for the exclusiveness of a status group: although, in themselves, they are rarely sufficient, 
almost always they come into play to some extent” (p. 935). It is crucial that status groups are based 
on consumption patterns, or styles of life, in order to grasp Weber’s importance for the study of 
leisure. Leisure itself in fact becomes an indicator of status honor and shared leisure interests and 
consumption patterns are potentially powerful sources of honor, prestige, and the power that comes 
with that.   
   
Building on Weber 
With regard to the relevance of consumption for social inequality, the work of Pierre Bourdieu has 
been most influential, especially his major work Distinction (1984). In this book, Bourdieu leans 
heavily on Weber. Consumption patterns, or lifestyles, are (re)produced through differential access 
to economic, cultural, and social capital embodied in habitus.  By introducing the concepts of 
cultural and symbolic capital, Bourdieu acknowledged, too, that social inequality entails not just 
economic or class differences. It is based on other sources of honor, especially cultural capital as 
indicated by manners and taste. Bourdieu does not, however, follow Weber in trying to clearly 
demarcate classes from status groups. He rather treats status as the symbolic aspect of class 
structure, arguing that class positions are not defined by economic resources alone. Instead of 
assuming objective class boundaries based on economic structures, Bourdieu focuses on “the 
structured formation or self-production of class collectivities through struggles that simultaneously 
involve relationships between and within classes and determine the actual demarcation of their 
frontiers. Bourdieu replaces the concept of class structure with that of social space, understood as 
the multidimensional distribution of socially effective forms of power (or capital, be it economic, 
cultural or social) underlying social positions” (Wacquant, 1991, p. 52). 
 More recent scholarly work has shown a growing interest in distinguishing between class 
and status in studies of cultural lifestyles or leisure activities. According to Chan and Goldthorpe 
(2010), a main weakness of research into the relation between social stratification and leisure 
consumption results from inadequacies in the operationalization of the former which typically fails 
to apply Weber’s distinction between class and status. Referring to Weber, they argue that classes 
are not real sociocultural groupings; yet, class has been the main way to operationalize social 
inequality. The status order seems however more relevant for understanding cultural consumption 
as it is more explicitly linked to social honor. Status is expressed in differential association with 
others and “lifestyles that are seen as appropriate to different status levels. Status affiliations are 
thus more likely than class affiliations to be ‘real’ in the sense of ones that are recognised by and 
meaningful to the social actors involved” (p. 12). Lamenting the “loss of Weberian refinement” (p. 
12), they demonstrate that since the 1950s, class and status have not been properly distinguished 
but used interchangeably by scholars from both the US and Europe, assuming, like Bourdieu, that 
class and status are necessarily closely and universally connected. The international survey 
research project launched by Chan and Goldthorpe re-establishes Weber’s distinction. It 
demonstrates that, indeed, cultural consumption is stratified more by social status, which was 
measured using information on the occupations of significant others, than by social class (Chan, 
2010; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007).   
 Finally, we can also see the growing interest in taking the status group concept seriously in 
attempts to link lifestyles to the composition of people’s social networks (Mark, 1998; Lizardo, 
2006). Using relational data is increasingly called for in order to understand leisure patterns in their 
social context. DellaPosta, Shi and Macy (2015, pp. 1502) argue as follows: “Unlike the members 
of the underlying population, the respondents in a national random sample are atomized 
individuals, unaccompanied by friends and family. In the absence of relational data, there is no 
way to measure the effects of sorting and influence in the clustering of opinions. Investigators are 
then left with only one analytical option: to assign all the explanatory power to other individual 
attributes”. This calls for more research that pays explicit attention to shared interpretations, 
concrete interactions and group identification when explaining leisure and taste patterns. Thus, 
explanations of cultural taste patterns, e.g.  omnivorism, are increasingly cast in terms of underlying 
shared values (Van Eijck & Lievens, 2008, Ollivier 2008), (changing) symbolic boundaries (Holt, 
1997; Friedman & Kuipers, 2013; Jarness, 2015) and people’s engagement in multiple status 




In this chapter we discussed the relevance of the insights of Max Weber for leisure theory.  First, 
we discussed the Protestant Ethic and the absence of leisure, focusing on the relationship between 
religion and consumption. Second, we took at closer look at Weber’s ideas on the bureaucracy and 
the rationalization of leisure, and how these ideas were used to discuss McDonaldization and re-
enchantment. Third, we included a section on social inequality and leisure, discussing how status 
– vis-à-vis class –matters for lifestyle studies. While we demonstrated that each approach has led 
to fruitful new research, we would like to end this contribution by suggesting some avenues for 
future research. First, despite a trend towards secularization in most Western countries, religion 
remains important and in many parts of the world its impact is increasing, especially if we look at 
Islam. More research could examine how religion affects leisure consumption across the globe, 
particularly with a context of societal integration, and how particular religious values are translated 
into leisure restrictions or opportunities. Second, how does re-enchantment work with online 
leisure consumption? To what extent do online enchantment rituals and meaning-making processes 
differ between online and offline cultural practices? Finally, the growing interest in the class-status 
distinction opens up the field of inequality and leisure to questions of shifting hierarchies of honor 
and prestige. Which leisure activities are considered more or less legitimate and how do non-class 
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